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by Addison M. Bowman· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This anide describes a unique program of judicial education and trammg be-
ing conducted by American law professors in Micronesia. l Sponsored jointly by 
the Supreme Coun of the Federated States of Micronesia, the Supreme Coun of 
the Republic of Palau, and the William S. Richardson School of Law at the 
University of Hawaii, a series of semi-annual, two-week seminars designed to 
impart essential legal skills to approximately fifteen Micronesian judges has been 
in progress since 1982. The Micronesian transition from Trust Territory of the 
Pacific Islands2 to a duster of emergent Pacific nations3 is evidenced by new 
constitutions and new governments and accession to political leadership by 
Micronesians. The constitutions that have been adopted in the Federated States 
• Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii at Manoa. 
A.B., Dartmouth College, 1957; LL.B., Dickinson School of Law, 1963; LL.M., Georgetown 
University Law Center, 1964. 
1 Apart from Australia, Indonesia and the Philippines, the Pacific islands are divided into 
three groups: Melanesia, stretching from Papua-New Guinea to New Caledonia and Fiji and 
including the Solomons and New Hebrides; Polynesia, stretching ftom New Zealand to Hawaii 
and including Samoa, the Marquesas and Cook Islands; and Micronesia (""small islands"), consist-
ing of the four archipelagoes of the Mariana, Catoline, Marshall, and Gilbert Islands. For an 
historical and anthropological survey of these islands, see D. OUVER, THE PACIFIC ISLANDS (rev. 
ed. 1975). 
2 The United States acquired the Caroline, Mariana, and Marshall Islands in 1945, and since 
1947 has administered them under a Trusteeship Agreement approved by the United Nations 
Security Council and the United States. See infra text accompanying note 19. See also Trusteeship 
Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands, 61 Stat. 3301, T.I.A.S. No. 1665 (1947), 
reprinted in 2 FSM CODE 895 (1982). The Trusteeship Agreement is also reprinted in C. HEINE, 
MICRONESIA AT THE CROSSROADS (1974). 
a The Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic 
of Palau will perhaps soon be nation-states "freely associated" with the United States. See infra 
text accompanying notes 93-97. The free association status and the proposed arrangement with 
the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands are discussed in Clark, Self-Determination 
and Free Association-Should the United Nations Terminate the Pacific Islands Trust?, 21 HARV. 
INT'L L.]. 1 (1980). 
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of Micronesia· and the Republic of Palau6 create judicial systems that closely 
resemble their American counterparts, and a common law jurisprudence has 
taken rOOt. The judicial education program described in this article aims to 
generate a proficiency in common law analysis and decision making sufficient to 
enable Micronesian judges, as they decide the cases that will come before them, 
to fashion a common law embodying the traditions and aspirations of the Mi-
cronesian peoples. 
II. GEOGRAPHICAL, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND 
The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) is a nation of 607 islands8 cover-
ing a huge expanse of ocean north of the equator and west of the international 
dateline.' FSM includes most of the Caroline Islands.8 What were formerly the 
island districts of Ponape, Truk, and Yap are now the four Federated States of 
Kosrae,9 Pohnpei,I° Truk,ll and Yap.12 The 607 islands of FSM comprise a 
• The FSM Constitution is reprinted on p. C-3 of I FSM CODE (1982). For a comprehensive 
history of the development and adoption of the FSM Constitution, see N. MELLER. CONSTlTIJ· 
T10NAUSM IN MICRONESIA (1985). 
6 The Palau Constitution is reprinted in PALAU NATIONAL CODE (1986). 
6 FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA. NATIONAL YEARBOOK OF STATISTICS 5 (1981) {hereinaf-
ter FSM STATISTICS). A number of the islands are high islands evidencing geologically recem 
volcanic activiry, but most are sandy, coral islets forming atolls and encircling lagoons. For an 
explanation of the geological evolution from high islands to coral atolls, see E. LARSON AND P. 
BIRKELAND. PuTNAM'S GEOLOGY 535 (4th ed. 1982). Only 52 of the islands are inhabited. See 
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE. TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS. 37TH ANNUAL REPORT TO THE 
UNITED NATIONS 3 (1984). 
7 FSM lies between 10 and 120 north latitude, and between 1370 and 1630 east longitude. Its 
eastern flank, Kosrae, lies midway between Honolulu and Australia and its western flank, Yap, 
lies directly east of the Philippines and midway between Australia and Japan. 
S The Carolines, one of the four archipelagoes of Micronesia, comprise the island groupings of 
Pohnpei, Truk, Yap, and Palau, in east-to-west order. See supra note I. The Palau Islands have 
become the Republic of Palau; the balance of the Carolines is now the Federated States of Micro-
nesia. See supra note 3. 
9 Kosrae (previously spelled Kusaie), consisting of five islands with a total land area of 42.3 
miles and a population of 6,262, was formerly part of Pohnpei, but in 1977 was detached and 
became one of the four FSM states. N. MELLER, supra note 4, at 25. Statistical information is 
derived from U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 6, and from FSM STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 4. 
10 Pohnpei (previously Ponape) consists of 163 islands with a land area of 133.4 square miles 
and a population of 26,922. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 6; FSM STATISTICS, supra 
note 6, at 4. The principal island, a high island also called Pohnpei, is one of the largest islands in 
Micronesia with an area of 129 square miles. The seat of the FSM national government is in 
Kolonia, Pohnpei's main town. For statistical data concerning Pohnpei, see PONAPE STATE STATlS· 
TICS OFFICE, PONAPE STATISTICAL YEARBOOK FOR 1981. 
11 Truk has 290 islands, a land area of but 49.2 square miles, and a population of 44,596. 
Truk thus claims half the population of FSM. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 6; FSM STATlS· 
TICS, supra note 6, at 4. 
11 Yap boasts 149 islands, a land area of 45.9 square miles, and a population of 10,595. See 
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land mass of but 270 square miles and support a population of 88,375.13 The 
Republic of Palau, consisting of 200 small islands with a land mass of 179 
square miles and a population of 14,000, makes up the balance of the Carolines 
and lies to the west of FSM.14 
Most of the Caroline Islands lie between 4° and 10° north latitude, and the 
climate is tropical. Natural resources are meager, especially on the atolls, and 
much of the population engages in subsistence farming and fishing. U Coconut, 
taro, and breadfruit are the principal subsistence crops. Marine resources are 
plentiful, and many Micronesian atolls encircle large lagoons shielded from 
ocean turbulence and teeming with fish and marine life. I6 
Micronesian society is traditionally matrilineal, and the matrilineage consisted 
of an extended clan with governance and landholding functions. 17 Traditional 
tides and chiefly rank were associated with clan membership and the location 
and size of the clan lands. Custom and tradition continue to exen powerful 
influence throughout FSM and Palau but erosion is evident. Many young people 
have migrated from outer islands and villages to the principal towns, where 
salaried work is available. 
American education [has} laid a foundation of knowledge and values which [has} 
gradually undermined satisfaction with a village life-style based upon subsistence 
farming supplemented by income earned from copra marketing, and constrained 
by the remaining hierarchical premises of tradition. IS 
For the past hundred years the people of the Caroline Islands have been 
dependent upon four successive foreign powers: Spain (1885-98), which ac-
quired the Carolines through papal arbitration; Germany (1899-1914), which 
purchased the Carolines from Spain; Japan (1914-45), which wrested the 
Carolines from Germany and colonized them; and United States (since 1945), 
u.s. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 6; FSM STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 5. Life on a Yapese island is 
chronicled in K. BROWER. A SONG FOR SATAWAL (1983). 
13 V S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 6, at 2. 
,. See DISTRICT ADMINISTRATOR OF PALAU, THIS Is PALAU 10 (1965); Kluge, Palau Isn't Sure 
Whether "Paradise" Is There-Or Here, SMITHSONIAN, Sept. 1986, at 44. 
16 In 1984, of FSM's population of 88,375, only 10,160 were employed as wage earners by 
government and private enterprise, see V.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 6, at 2. 
18 See W. ALKIRE, CORAL ISLANDERS 23-28 (1978); W. ALKIRE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
PEOPLES AND CULTIIRES OF MICRONESIA 7 (2d ed. 1977) (hereinafter PEOPLES AND CULTIIRES OF 
MICRONESIA}. 
17 See PEOPLES AND CULTIIRES OF MICRONESIA, supra note 16, at 26-67. See also infra note 55 
for a discussion of Trukese sociery. 
18 N. MELLER, supra note 4, at 17. 
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which seized the Carolines in World War II and has since governed and ad-
ministered them as part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. I9 Through-
out that century the Micronesians have preserved their languages,20 maintained· 
their customs and traditions, and sustained a hope for freedom and autonomy. 
Now, anticipating approval of the Compacts of Free Association,21 Micronesians 
look hopefully toward a time of virtual political independence. 
Since 1962 the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TIPI) has been admin-
istered by the United States Secretary of the Interior.22 This administration in-
cluded the exercise of executive, legislative, and judicial functions and the desig-
nation and appointment of personnel for these purposes. The Trust Territory 
High Court, located on Saipan in the Mariana Islands, has until very recently 
performed all judicia!. functions in Micronesia.23 The High Court appointed 
local judges in the various districts of the TIPI, but the district courts had 
limited jurisdiction and the judges received little or no education or training. 
Most cases of any substance were taken to the High Court, which had a trial-
level division that traveled among the various districts to hear the disputes that 
arose. 
By plebiscite held on July 12, 1978, the people of Kosrae, Pohnpei, Truk, 
and Yap adopted and ratified the Constitution of the Federated States of Micro-
nesia.24 The first FSM Congress convened in 1979,2~ and in 1981 President 
18 For a description of this hiscory, see C HEINE, MICRONESIA AT THE CROSSROADS (1974); N. 
MELLER. THE CONGRESS OF MICRONESIA (1969). Meller writes: 
Over 6,000 Americans were killed wresting Micronesia from Japanese control, and the 
temper of the American people hardly countenanced surrendering the islands to any other 
nation; conversely, the United States had early declared it sought no territorial gains fcom 
World War II. The placing of the area under United Nations trusteeship resolved the 
dilemma, and in 1947, with the Trusteeship Agreement, the islands technically came 
under civil administration. 
/d. at 14. Governance of the Trust Territory was entrusted to the Commander-in-Chief, United 
States Pacific Fleet, from 1947 until 1951, when the responsibiliry was shifted to the Department 
of the Interior. Id. at 14-17. 
20 Each of the four Federated States has a separate language, and there are many dialects. Most 
people speak their own language plus at least English or Japanese. It is probable that English will 
become the common language of the Federated States. See C HEINE, supra note 19, at 92. 
English is the language of the Government of the Federated States. See FSM STATISTICS, supra 
note 6. The same is true of Palau. Article XIII, section 1 of the Palau Constitution declares that 
"Palauan and English shall be the official languages," and section 2 elaborates: "The Palauan and 
English versions of this Constitution shall be equally authoritative; in case of conflict, the English 
version shall prevail." 
21 See infra text accompanying notes 93-96. 
22 EXEC. ORDER NO. 11,021,48 U.S.C § 1681 (1982). 
28 See Bowman, Legitimacy and Scope of Trust Territory High Court Power to Review Decisions 
of Federated States of Micronesia Supreme Court: The Ocokichy Cases, 5 U. HAW. L. REV. 57, 65-
68 (1983). 
24 Id. at 62. See generally N. MELLER, supra note 4. Pursuant to article XVI ('"effective date"), 
the FSM Constitution took effect one year after ratification. According to 1 FSM CODE intro. 
(1982), the "establishment of constitutional government [took place) on May 10, 1979." 
26 See Bowman, supra note 23, at 62. 
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Tosiwo Nakayama administered the oath of office to FSM Supreme Court Chief 
Justice Edward C. King. King, an American lawyer, recognized an immediate 
need for judicial training in FSM. Micronesians had no experience in self-gov-
ernment, yet self-government was fast becoming a reality under a Constitution 
bearing substantial similarity to the United States Constitution. Constitutional 
conventions, moreover, were in progress or on schedule in the four FSM states 
of Kosrae, Pohnpei, Truk, and Yap and, predictably, those state constitutions 
would create state court systems with plenary jurisdiction and power similar to 
their United States state court counterparts. 
The FSM Constitution creates a tripartite national government with checks 
and balances,26 and adopts a federal model with four constituent states and 
state governments. The national government is a government of power "ex-
pressly delegated (or] . . . indisputably national (in] character. ,,27 As in the 
United States, the states hold the residual power.28 The Constitution "is the 
supreme law of the Federated States of Micronesia ... (and any) act of the 
Government in conflict with this Constitution is invalid to the extent of con-
flict. "29 Article IV contains a "Declaration of Rights" that closely resembles the 
United States Bill of Rights. 30 Article XI treats the judicial function and estab-
lishes the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to "review cases heard in the national 
courts, and cases heard in state or local courts if they require interpretation of 
this Constiturion, national law, or a treaty. "31 The judicial article also contains 
what Chief Justice King calls the "judicial guidance" provision: "Court deci-
26 Id. at 62-64. See also infra note 72. 
27 FSM CONST. art. VIII, § I. 
28 Id. § 2. 
29 Id. art. II, § I. 
30 For example, art. IV, § 5 specifies: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable search, seizure, or invasion of privacy 
may not be violated. A warranr may not issue except on probable cause, supported by affidavit 
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." In FSM v. 
Tipen, 1 FSM Intrm. 79 (Tr. Div. Pohnpei 1982), Chief Justice King, writing as trial division 
judge, noted the striking similarity between section 5 and the U.S. Constitution's fourth amend-
ment, and observed that the Micronesian drafters had cited and alluded to U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions construing the Bill of Rights. "Thus," concluded King, "the Journal of the Micronesian 
Constitutional Convention teaches that, in interpreting the Declaration of Rights in the Constitu-
tion of the Federated States of Micronesia, we should emphasize and carefully consider United 
States Supreme Court interpretations of comparable language in the Bill of Rights of the United 
States Constitution." Id. at 85. 
31 FSM CONST. art. XI, § 7. Section 6 vestS in the trial division of the Supreme Court "con-
current original jurisdiction in cases arising under this Constitution; national law or treaties; and 
in disputes . . . between citizens of different states . . . ." 
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sions shall be consistent with this Constitution, Micronesian customs and tradi-
tions, and the social and geographical configuration of Micronesia.' '32 Regarding 
the states, the Constitution specifies simply that a "state shall have a democratic 
constitution. "33 
The state constitutions establish judicial systems in each of the four FSM 
states. The Yap Constitution, for example, ordains that the "judicial power of 
the State shall be vested in the State Court [which} . . . shall be the highest 
court of the State and shall consist of a Chief Justice and two Associate J us-
tices. "34 As in the national scheme, justices are appointed by the executive with 
advice and consent of the legislature.3Ci The state constitutions charge the state 
judiciaries with the responsibility for promulgating rules of practice and proce-
dure and for judicial administration. The state constitutions also require judicial 
deference to "state traditions and customs.' '88 Judicial systems have been estab-
lished in Kosrae, Pohnpei, Truk, and Yap and, as of 1987, twelve state justices 
have been appointed and confirmed and are hearing cases at the trial and appel-
late levels. 
Organizationally and functionally, then, the FSM national and state judiciar-
ies closely resemble their American counterparts, and state court judges are re-
quired to interpret and to apply constitutional and statutory language, to ana-
lyze and to follow precedent,87 and to administer state justice systems. The FSM 
Supreme Court sought and obtained a congressional mandate to develop a judi-
cial training program, recognizing that the proper discharge of these functions 
would require training and education. The first generation of Micronesian state 
judges has been drawn from the traditional societal leadership and has little if 
any background of formal law school training. These circumstances necessitate 
the development of a program of judicial education that emphasizes and incul-
32 FSM CONST. an. XI, § 1 J. See also Semens v. Continental Air Lines, 2 FSM Intrm. 131 
(Tr. Div. Pohnpei 1985) (construing the judicial guidance clause in a contract dispute). For a 
discussion of Semens, see infra text accompanying notes 52-53. 
33 FSM CONST. an. VII, § 2. 
34 YAP CONST. an. VII, §§ 1, 2. 
3a [d. § 3. 
3& See e.g., KOSRAE CONST. an. VI, § 9. Section 9 provides: "Coun decisions shall be consistent 
with this Constitution. State traditions and customs, and the social and geographical configuration 
of the State'" 
37 Of particular concern is the need for state judges to apply and to follow FSM Supreme 
Coun decisions construing the national constitution. The FSM Constitution provides, in anicle IX 
("Legislative"), § 2p that the definition and penalization of "major crimes" is a national function. 
The National Criminal Code defines "major crimes" as those punishable by three years or more 
imprisonment. FSM CoDE tit. 11, §902(a) (1982). The result is that crimes punishable by less 
than three years imprisonment are tried in the state couns. State coun criminal jurisdiction is 
thus not insubstantial and national constitutional due process and related guarantees are fully 
applicable in such cases. 
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cates basic skills essential to the proper conduct of the judicial function in a 
common law framework, with maximum sensitivity to the overarching Micro-
nesian desire to develop the law of the land and the sea in harmony with 
custom and tradition. These are ambitious goals. Chief Justice King's first step 
was to contact the faculty of the Richardson School of Law at the University of 
Hawaii. Hawaii's proximity to Micronesia was a factor in that decision,38 as 
was King's belief that a faculty sensitive to issues peculiar to island societies 
would be most likely to contribute positively to the implementation of the judi-
cial guidance provisions. The program commenced in 1982. 
III. HISTOR Y OF THE PROGRAM 
Early seminars39 were held in August, 1982, and March, 1983, in Pohnpei 
which is the seat of the national government.40 Each seminar laste~ two weeks 
and consisted of two three-hour sessions per day for five days per week. Chief 
Justice King and his associate on the FSM Supreme Court, Justice Richard H. 
Benson, attended most seminar sessions and contributed to the early attainment 
of one important goal, that the seminars eschew a traditional teacher/student 
dichotomy and achieve a style of participatoty dialogue that recognizes and re-
spects evety participant's ability to offer a meaningful individual contribution to 
the common educational task. The discussion format was facilitated also by the' 
number of participants. The 1982 seminar, for example, had but ten partici-
pants including King and Benson. 
The 1982 and 1983 seminars featured original materials that were distrib-
uted to the judges one month in advance of the seminars.H The materials in-
cluded opinions from the United States and FSM Supreme Courts, constitu-
tional and statutoty excerpts, readings on legal analysis and the application of 
precedent, and a great many questions and problems that would focus seminar 
88 Hawaii lies roughly halfway between the American mainland and Micronesia. 
88 A judicial education seminar consisting of FSM Supreme Court justices and Trust Territory 
district court judges (some of whom would be appointed as state court justices) was held in 
Kosrae in August, 1981. "This was a reasonable first effort," notes Chief justice King in a letter 
to the author dated March 31, 1986, "but ... we plainly did not have time to put the neces-
sary materials together and probably did not have the resources . . . to do so." 
40 Each of the two seminars was conducted by the author and by his colleague, Williamson B. 
C. Chang. Chang is an Associate Professor at the William S. Richardson School of Law, Univer-
siry of Hawaii at Manoa. 
41 A. BOWMAN, MATERIALS AND QUESTIONS FOR THE JUDICIAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING SEM-
INAR FOR THE JUDGES OF THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA (983); W. CHANG, CASES AND 
MATERIALS FOR THE JUDICIAL EDUCATION; AND TRAINING SEMINAR FOR THE JUDGES OF THE FED-
ERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA (983); A. BoWMAN & W. CHANG, CASES AND MATERIALS FOR 
THE JUDICIAL TRAINING SEMINAR FOR THE JUDGES OF THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA 
(982). 
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discussion and facilitate collective problem solving. For example, at the 1982 
seminar one discussion topic concerned the enforcement of judgments, a topic 
that was included in the agenda at the request of a Trukese justice. The materi-
als contained some readings describing the law of enforcement of judgments in 
the United States and the following note: 
Anglo-American law has always favored money judgments in contract and tort 
cases, but this traditional development has been based on the assumption that 
judgment debtors will have money or attachable property. If this assumption does 
not usually hold true in Micronesia, then alternatives to money judgments should 
perhaps be explored. We will devote a training session to the exploration of this 
problem. In preparation, please give some thought to the following questions. 
In contract cases, there is the alternative of ordering specific performance. 
Should the remedy of specific performance be more readily available to contract 
plaintiffs? How have Micronesians customarily treated one who defaulted on a 
promise or a bargain? 
In tort cases involving negligent or intentional injuty to persons or property, 
what alternatives to money damages are there? How have Micronesians customa-
rily treated the toccfeasor? Could the tortfeasor be ordered to repair property, or to 
perform services? Has there been a traditional ceremony of apology? Has such a 
ceremony been considered adequate in the past? Should the law seek to enforce 
money judgments in areas where money damages have not been traditionally 
applied?42 
As one ponders these questions, it becomes apparent that the faculty learns at 
least as much during seminar sessions as do the students. 
The early seminars yielded a full realization of the responsibility of the judges 
for the development of the common law of Micronesia. The FSM has a penal 
code4s but little legislation in the areas of contract, property, and tort, the pre-
dictable subject matter of the' state judges' plenary jurisdiction. There are prece-
dents from the Trust Territory High Coun but those precedents are not 
mandatory and FSM judges are free to disregard them if wise social policy or 
due regard for custom and tradition dictates. In a word, the transition from 
Trust Territory of the United States to nationhood creates a moment of juris-
prudential discontinuity that invites, if not requires, a reexamination of funda-
mental norms and values. This realization serves to imbue the seminars with a 
deepened sense of responsibility and purpose. And in addition to impaning 
basic analytical skills, the seminars take on the added dimension of confronting 
the judges with policy choices that may be presented to them in future litiga-
tion and generating the collective wisdom of a group of men currently occupy-
42 A. BOWMAN & W. CHANG. supra note 41. at 60, 
4S National Criminal Code, FSM CODE tit. 11 (1982). 
1987 / JUDICIAL SEMINARS 541 
ing traditional leadership roles as well as judicial positions. 
In retrospect we view the 1982 and 1983 seminars as initial, experimental 
components in a challenging undertaking in judicial education. By 1984 most 
of the first generation of state court judges had been appointed and confirmed. 
And by 1984, King and the author were able to articulate their primary goals: 
that within three to five years the seminars would yield training equivalent to 
the first year of formal law study, including the basic technique of common law 
analysis, and would enable the Micronesian judges to discharge their ongoing 
judicial tasks with increasing competence and confidence. 
The inaugural seminar of the current series was held in Yap State in June, 
1984.·· In attendance at the Yap seminar was Chief Justice Mamoru 
Nakamura of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Palau. After participating 
in the seminar, Nakamura pledged Palau's future co-sponsorship of the semi-
nars and offered to host the next one. The Palau seminar was held in January, 
1985.u The second 1985 seminar was held in June in Pohnpei.·e The Febru-
ary, 1986, seminar was held at the William S. Richardson School of Law in 
Honolulu and featured a diverse faculty including law professors, judges, and 
practicing lawyers. The June, 1986, seminar was hosted by Truk State:7 and 
the most recent seminar was held in Kosrae State in January, 1987 .• 8 
The 1984 Yap seminar began with a week of very basic legal analysis train-
ing. Topics on the agenda were "Nature and sources of law," "Opinion analysis 
and the concept of precedent," ''] udicial power and federalism," and "The role 
of custom." Again the materials were original.·9 Judges were asked to brief 
cases in advance of the seminar and to hand in their briefs for evaluation. 
Opinions were analyzed in the seminar sessions and the analysis was brought to 
bear on the solution of hypothetical problems. For example, the judges read and 
briefed In re Iriar/e,GO a case in which the FSM Supreme Court trial division 
held that a summary contempt proceeding had violated the alleged contemnor's 
due process rights. Seminar discussion of this opinion focused on the following 
44 This seminar was conducted by the author and his colleague, Mari Matsuda. Matsuda is an 
Assistant Professor at the William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii at Manoa. 
40 The Palau seminar was conducted by John Barkai and Mari Matsuda. Barkai is a Professor 
of Law at the William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii at Manoa. 
48 The June, 1985, seminar was conducted by the author and by Jon Van Dyke. Van Dyke is 
a Professor of Law at the William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii at Manoa. 
47 The June, 1986, seminar was conducted by Van Dyke and Eric K. Yamamoto. Yamamoto 
is an Assistant Professor at the William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii at 
Manoa. 
48 This seminar was conducted by the author and Amy H. Kaste1y. Kaste1y is an Associate 
Professor at the William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii at Manoa. 
48 See A. BOWMAN & M. MATSUDA, SYllABUS AND MATERIALS FOR TIlE FEDERATED STATES OF 
MICRONESIA JUDICIAL SEMINAR (1984). 
00 1 FSM Intrm. 239a (Tr. Div. Pohnpei 1983). 
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questions that were included in the materials following the lriarte opinion: 
From your brief of the Iriarle decision, try co answer the following questions: 
What is a "contempt of court"? Where does the power co punish for contempt 
come from? Does your court have that power? What is "summary contempt"? 
When is summary contempt procedure appropriate? What was wrong with Judge 
Diana's contempt order? What should Judge Diana have done? What would you 
do if a person speaks to you in court the way Iriarte did to Diana? Are you 
bound by the Iriarle opinion and decision? Why or why not?lil 
Custom and tradition are of paramount importance to Micronesians, and the 
judicial guidance clauseCi2 imposes an explicit obligation on every Micronesian 
judge, Chief Justice King has construed the clause in a recent decision requiring 
the interpretation of a contract: 
I consider the Judicial Guidance clause to impose the following requirements on 
the Court's analytic method, First, in the , , . event that a constitutional provi-
sion bears upon the case, that provision would prevail over any other source of 
law. Second, any applicable Micronesian custom or tradition would be considered 
and the Court's decision must be consistent therewith. If there is no directly 
applicable constitutional provision, custom or tradition, or if those sources are 
insufficient co resolve all issues in the case, then the Court may look to the law of 
other nations. Any approach drawn from those other sources, however, must be 
consistent with the . . . principles of, and values inherent in, Micronesian cus-
tom and tradition. Even then, the approach selected for the common law of the 
Federated States of Micronesia should reflect sensitive consideration of the "perti-
nent aspects of Micronesian sociery and culture," including Micronesian values 
and the realities of life here in general . . . . &8 
Judges attending the Yap seminar read and briefed FSM v, Ruben/'· a prosecu-
tion for assault with a machete in which a question of custom was presented. 
Sometime after midnight, when defendant and his wife and four small children 
were at home sleeping, defendant's wife's brother, in a drunken condition, ap-
proached the house, called out for his sister, and demanded food. Receiving no 
response, he kicked in the front door and entered the house where he was 
confronted by the defendant with a machete. Defendant then drove the intruder 
away from the house and in the effort cut the latter in the chest, In response to 
the defense argument that the assault was but an incident of the defendant's 
reasonable defense of his family and his household, the prosecution asserted that 
51 A. BOWMAN & M. MATSUDA, Jllpra note 49, at 116. 
62 See Jllpra text accompanying notes 32 and 36. 
53 Semens v. Continental Air Lines, 2 FSM Intrm. at 140-41. 
54 1 FSM Intrm. 34 (Tr. Div. Truk 1981). 
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Micronesian custom allowed the brother-in-law free access to defendant's house 
and entitled the former to demand and receive food from defendant and his 
wife. 1I11 Indeed, even the defense agreed that "as a general proposition [the de-
fendant's] own house is that of his brother-in-law and that his brother-in-law 
should have free access to it. "118 But the defense maintained, and the court 
agreed, that this customary privilege did not "extend to entry of the house at 
1:00 a.m. in drunken condition destroying property, awakening and frightening 
the children and causing all in the house to be concerned about their personal 
safery."117 The government's argument was rejected and the defendant was 
acquitted. 
The Ruben case was a superb vehicle for seminar discussion and analysis. The 
court decided that the government had the burden of proving the applicability 
of the custom it asserted and that, no evidence on the point having been 
presented, the burden had not been met. liS The obvious question, "How would 
a custom be proved?" generated a lively discussion. Some judges suggested they 
would take judicial notice of a custom. Others maintained that expert witnesses 
should be presented on such a question. liB Of great interest was the realization 
that the judges themselves divided on the question of the applicability of the 
custom to the Ruben facts. Custom, like the common law, can provide but a set 
of general propositions, the applicability of which, in any given situation, may 
be -in doubt. Of utmost importance, the judges agreed, is that litigants, or 
judges acting sua sponte, should inject custom and tradition into litigation 
whenever relevant in order to infuse the developing common law with this 
material. 
A question of custom and the law was presented in FSM v. Mudong,60 deny-
ing a motion to dismiss an aggravated assault prosecution. Mudong had alleg-
edly attacked and injured one Manasa, and the opinion recounted the basis for 
55 "Trukese society," comments Alkire, "is based on a number of matrilineal clans (einang) 
which regulate marriage. Postmarital residence is matrilocal, and thus the basic social group is 
made up of several sisters and their children, minus out-martying males plus in-martying hus-
bands .... A man after marriage has labor obligations not only to his wife's lineage but also to 
his sisters' (his own) lineage." PEOPLES AND CULTURES OF MICRONESIA, supra note 16, at 56. The 
result would be that both Ruben and his wife would have intraclan obligations to the latter's 
brother. 
116 Ruben, 1 FSM Intrm. at 39. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
58 The Judiciary Act of 1979, 1 FSM CODE tit. 4, § 113 (1982) ("assessors") allows justices 
of the supreme COUrt to "appoint one or more assessors to advise ... with respect to local law 
or custom or such other matters requiring specialized knowledge." Similar provisions appear in 
state legislation. See, e.g., Ponape State Judiciary Act of 1982, S.L. No. 2L-160-82, § 5; Truk 
State Judiciary Act of 1982, Act No. 2-32, § 23. 
60 1 FSM Inurn. 135 (Tr. Div. Pohnpei 1982). 
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Mudong's motion: 
About one week before the criminal proceedings were initiated, some 100 peo-
ple, including the families of Messrs. Mudong {and) 
Manasa ... gathered ... to discuss the "friction" between the fami-
lies. . . . At the meeting, the families offered and accepted apologies. Then, "to 
solemnize the occasion and to purge the bad feeling, both sides sat together and 
shared cups of sakau, something very important in the Ponapean tradi-
tion ...... {The) uncle of Ketson Manasa ... states that "it is the consensus of 
both sides that bad feelings be put to a stop, and that further prosecution of the 
criminal case may hinder that goal. . . . {F)or that reason, both sides agreed 
that request has to be made to the proper authorities to dismiss the case. "61 
The motion thus asserted that the customary settlement had effected appropri-
ate reparations and resolved all hostilities, and that the victim and his family 
approved the request to terminate the prosecution. The court denied the motion 
but discussed the potential impact of a customary settlement in a criminal case. 
The decision to terminate a criminal prosecution, the court recognized, "is, 
with limited exceptions, within the discretion of the prosecutor. "62 That 
prosecutorial discretion rests upon important policy and separation-of-powers 
considerations.6s The Mudong prosecutor opposed the motion to dismiss and 
thereby asserted the state's paramount interest in the continuation of the case. 
The opinion recognized that the prosecutor represented "the more generalized 
interests of the larger sociery"6.f and that the function of the criminal proceed-
ing is quite different from that of a customary apology and forgiveness cere-
mony. The ritual ceremony resolves disputes between families and fosters har-
mony among families and clans. The criminal sanction, on the other hand, 
vindicates society's interests in punishing the wrongdoer. "The two systems," 
the court concluded, "can be seen as supplementary and complementary, not 
contradictory. "611 There is no reason for one to preempt or obviate the other. 
Shouldn't the law encourage customary dispute settlements? In a thoughtful 
piece of policy analysis, the Mudong court observed that, although families of 
accused persons "might find ... termination of court proceedings a powerful 
incentive to enter into a customary settlement . . . the family of the victim 
might be more willing to . . . enter into a customary settlement with the 
family of the defendant, if the victim's family is confident that the constitu-
81 Id. at 137. 
02 Id. at 140. The principle is a familar one in American jurisprudence. See Inmates of Attica 
Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Cox, 342 
F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965). 
8S Mudong, I FSM Intrm. at 140-41. 
e. Id. at 145. 
80 Id. 
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tional legal system will deal with the defendant."66 In dictum the court ob-
served that the court could, at sentencing time, "usefully consider and respond 
to" the fact of customary apology, forgiveness, and settlement.67 In this way the 
court wisely accommodated the customary and criminal justice systems and, 
incidentally, generated an excellent teaching vehicle for the judicial seminar. 
The second week of the Yap seminar was devoted to tort law, and the week 
began with a mock trial involving a construction accident in which a bulldozer 
had injured a child. The ca.se presented questions of individual and vicarious 
tort liabiliry and damages. One of the judges presided, and thereafter all judges 
were given an afternoon to write an opinion deciding the case. To date, every 
rwo-week seminar has devoted one full day to a mock trial and opinion-writing 
exercise. There are no juries in FSM, and trials are thus simplified in all but one 
respect: the trial judge must produce a written record of fact findings and legal 
conclusions adequate for appellate review.6s Accordingly, the mock trials rypi-
cally present one or two contested fact issues and a law question. Should the 
court adopt the principle of respondeat superior? This question was squarely 
presented in the mock trial in Yap. On questions such as this there is a ten-
dency to reach almost automatically for American law, but the instructor's func-
tion is to invoke the judicial guidance provision and the analysis it demands.89 
The judges decided that respondeat superior was not inconsistent with Microne-
sian values, and produced written opinions explaining their reasoning. 
The second installment of torts was delivered during the second week of the 
Palau seminar, held in January, 1985. The instruction included basic tort law, 
elements of a negligence case, vicarious liability, the role of insurance, products 
liability, malpractice, and defamation.70 The first week of the Palau seminar 
treated several units of basic judicial functioning, including the conduct of pre-
trial motions and settlement conferences, decision-making in the bail, sentenc-
ing, and small claims contexts, legal research, and opinion writing. Simulated 
bail hearings, guilty pleas, sentencings, pretrial conferences, settlement confer-
ences, and a trial were conducted. Materials included a hypothetical criminal 
case involving weapon and drug charges and presenting a question of posses-
88 [d. at 147. 
87 [d. at 148. 
88 The 1985 Pohnpei seminar, devoted one session to "Trial judge's duty to make a proper 
record for appellate review." See A. BOWMAN &]. VAN DYKE, SYLLABUS AND MATERIALS FOR THE 
FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA JUDICIAL SEMINAR 163-83 (1985). See also infra text accompa-
nying notes 71-88. Included in these materials were FED. R. CIv. P. 52, FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(c), 
readings from NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE TRIAL JUDGES, THE STATE TRIAL JUDGE'S BOOK 
(2d ed. 1969), and Stevenson & Zappen, An Approach to Writing Trial Court Opinions, 67 
JUDICATURE 336 (1984). 
88 See supra notes 52 & 53 and accompanying text. 
70 See]. BARKAI & M. MATSUDA, SYLLABUS AND MATERIALS FOR THE FEDERATED STATES OF 
MICRONESIA JUDICIAL SEMINAR (1984). 
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sion. Written opinions deciding the case were obtained from the judges and 
evaluated. 
The third seminar in the current series, held at Pohnpei in June, 1985, was 
devoted to constitutional law and evidence law.71 The addition of the Palauan 
judges meant that two constitutions had to be treated. The Kosrae State Consti-
tution was also included in the materials. There are a number of similarities 
among the FSM, Palau, and United States Constitutions. Each establishes a 
tripartite national government with checks and balances,72 a national judiciary 
with supreme power of constitutional interpretation,73 and a declaration of due 
process and fundamental rights.74 The Pohnpei agenda included judicial review 
and jurisdiction, relationships among FSM, Palau, and the Trust Territory of 
the Pacific Islands, future relationships among FSM, Palau, the Marshall Is-
lands, and the United States, state-national relations in FSM, jurisdiction over 
marine resources, due process, equal protection, and freedom of expression and 
religion. This was a rich menu, and additional time at the February, 1986, 
seminar was required to complete it. The 1985 Pohnpei seminar included a 
mock trial that presented a question of irregular employment termination rais-
ing freedom of expression, equal protection, and contested fact issues. The 
judges performed all the roles in this trial, and were critiqued. 
The second week of the Pohnpei seminar was devoted to evidence law. A 
judicial system without juries lends itself to simplified evidence rules and the 
author, at the 1984 Yap seminar, had committed himself to the development 
of a streamlined set of non-jury evidence rules for FSM and Palau. The 1985 
Pohnpei materials 711 contained the following prefatory note: 
The evidence materials are in fulfillment of a promise, made by the author in 
1984, to write a set of evidence rules suitable for nonjury trial practice in the 
Federated States of Micronesia. Using, in most instances, the United States Fed-
11 See A. BOWMAN &.]. VAN DYKE. SYllABUS AND MATERIAlS FOR THE FEDERATED STATES OF 
MICRONESIA JUDICIAL SEMINAR (1985). 
72 See, e.g., FSM CONST. art. IX ("Legislative"), 5§ 2(b) (ratification of treaties), 2(0) (im-
peachment of president, vice president, and justices), 2(q) (override presidential veto), 22 (presi-
dential veto); art. X (" Executive"), 5§ 1 (president elected by Congress), 2(c) (power of pardon), 
2(d) (appointment of judges with advice and consent of Congress); art. Xl (''judicial''), §§ 6(b), 
7 (together with art. II, power of constitutional interpretation and judicial review); PALAU CONST. 
art. VIII ("Executive"), §§ 7(4) (appointment of judges), 7(5) (power of pardon); art. IX ("legis-
lative"), §§ 5(7) (ratification of treaties), 5(8) (approval of presidential appointments), 5( 16) (im-
peachment of president, vice president, and justices), 15 (presidential veto and 2/3 override); art. 
X ("Judiciary"), §§ 5, 6 (together with art. II, power of constitutional interpretation and judicial 
review). 
73 FSM CONST. arcs. II, Xl; PALAU CONST. arts. II, X. 
7' FSM CONST. art. IV; PALAU CONST. art. IV. 
75 A. BOWMAN &. J . VAN DYKE, Jllpra note 71. 
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eral Rules of Evidence as a model, the author retained, adapted, or eliminated 
those rules depending on the criterion of suitabiliry for nonjury practice. The 
result is a set of proposed rules that could be adopted in the national and state 
courts. 
It is hoped that the judicial seminar sessions will test the rules in two ways: (1) 
By asking the judges to answer the questions and solve the problems that are 
interspersed throughout the materials . . . and thereby test the rules in the cru-
cible of application; and (2) By using the proposed rules as a focal point for 
policy analysis, on the assumption that no one is bener able to say what the FSM 
evidence rules should be than the FSM Judiciary. In this context the author will 
be happy to serve as reporter and provide drafts of amendments that are sug-
gested in seminar sessions.76 
The proposed evidence rules are characterized by two innovations. The first 
involves rule 403, which in the United States allows for the exclusion of rele-
vant evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by consid-
erations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. "77 Because of its pervasive scope and application, rule 403 is probably 
the most frequently invoked rule of evidence in jury trials.78 Its proposed refor-
mulation for non-jury practice is: "Although relevant, evidence may be ex-
cluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. "79 
The commentary to proposed rule 403 points out: 
The proposed rule eliminates "danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, [and) misleading the jury" as factors justifying exclusion of relevant evi-
dence. There are twO reasons for this: (1) These factors are problematical in jury 
trials but judges are considered able to avoid prejudice, confusion, and being 
misled; and (2) In any event, the judge must necessarily learn of the nature of the 
evidence when he hears the proffer, and since the dangers are thus unavoidably 
risked the evidence may just as well be admitted for whatever it is worth. Note 
that evidence of no value is excluded by rule 402, and so rule 403 operates only 
in contexts where the evidence has some relevancy. so 
The judges welcomed the proposed alternative to rule 403. They agreed that 
the trial judge necessarily confronts arguably prejudicial evidence under any for-
mulation of the rule. In the first place, most evidence issues arise during the 
76 Id. at 1-2. 
77 FED. R. EVID. 403. 
76 R. LEMPERT & S. SAlTZBURG, A MODERN ApPROACH TO EVIDENCE 156 (2d ed. 1983). 
79 A. BOWMAN & J. VAN DYKE, iupra note 71, at 45. 
60 Id. 
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trial, and in any event the classic rule 403 judgment is essentially a contextual 
one, involving as it does a prediction of the impact of a particular evidence item 
on the ultimate trial result.81 That is to say, even if a judicial colleague could be 
summoned to hear and dispose of a rule 403 objection, that person would be 
unable to furnish the ruling absent a substantial educational briefing concerning 
completed and anticipated trial events. Moreover, such a surrogate colleague 
may not be available in Micronesia. The FSM Supreme Court, for example, 
with trial and appellate jurisdiction, consists of but two justices. If one hears a 
case at the trial level, the other must be available to hear the appeal. 82 Under 
these circumstances the trial judge has little choice but to try· the case and 
resolve the evidence issues as fairly and efficiently as possible. 
The second innovation of the proposed non jury evidence code for FSM and 
Palau is a revision of the hearsay rule coupled with complete elimination of the 
hearsay exceptions: 
Bowman's proposed rille 801: Hearsay evidence generally admissible. 
(a) Hearsay defined. "Hearsay" is a statement uttered by someone other 
than the witness giving testimony and offered co prove the truth of the 
matter stated. 
(b) Admissibility. Hearsay is generally admissible. 
Bowman's proposed rille 802: Hearsay to be accorded proper weight. 
In assigning probative value co hearsay evidence the court should consider its 
relevancy in the rule 401 sense discounted by (1) the strength of the possibility 
that the statement was never uttered, and (2) the ability or inability of the oppo-
nent co test the credibility of the hearsay statement and its declarant.s3 
The elimination of the hearsay rule at bench trials has been strongly advocated 
by Kenneth Culp Davis.84 The hearsay analysis is arcane and convoluted and, 
more often than not, yields admissibility through one or more of the bur-
81 Unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and misleading the jury. as these phrases are 
employed in FED. R. EVID. 403. connote an improper skewing of the trial outcome by reason of 
receipt of evidence. See E. CLEARY. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 545-47 (3d ed. 1984). Professor 
Cleary observes: "Even the same item of evidence may fare differently from one case to the next. 
depending on its rela.tionship co the other evidence in the cases and the importance of the issues 
on which it bears." Id. at 546. 
82 The judicial article of the FSM Constitution specifies that each supreme court justice "is a 
member of both the trial division and the appellate division . . . (and that n]o jusrice may sit 
with rhe appellate division in a case heard by him in rhe erial division." FSM CaNST. art. XI. § 2. 
In order co constitute a rhree-justice appellare panel. the Court will designare cwo additional 
justices pursuant co art. XI. § 9: "The Chief Justice ... by rule may ... give special assign-
ments co retired Supreme Court justices and judges of state and other courts." 
8S A. BOWMAN &). VAN DYKE. supra note 71. at 159. 
M Davis. Hearsay in Nonjury Cases, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1970). 
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geoning exceptions. 811 Moreover, since the relevance rules are preemptive in all 
contexts, the hearsay exclusion, when effective, deprives the facdinder of evi-
dence of some worth. For this reason the rule has been called the "child of the 
jury."86 Its elimination in Micronesia was desired by the judges, and the only 
question remaining is whether the confrontation clause of the FSM Constitu-
tion,87 which has not yet been construed, will be offended by the receipt of 
hearsay against the accused in criminal cases.88 
In February, 1986, the FSM and Palau judiciary came to Honolulu for a 
two-week seminar at the University of Hawaii's Richardson School of Law. The 
Honolulu seminar was supported by a generous grant from the United States 
Information Agency.89 The agenda featured criminal and civil procedure, juve-
nile COUrtS, contracts and commercial law, and a constitutional law continua-
tion.90 The judges were welcomed by Hawaii's Governor George R. Ariyoshi, 
and were addressed by Hawaii Supreme Court Chief Justice Herman Lum on 
"The chief justice's role and responsbility in the matter of judicial administra-
tion and calendar control." Chief Judge James S. Burns of Hawaii's Intermedi-
ate Court of Appeals lectured on the subject of writing appellate opinions. 
The Honolulu seminar mock trial presented a motion to suppress evidence in 
a criminal case. The hypothetical facts occurred on the main thoroughfare in 
Kolonia, the seat of the national government and principal town in Pohnpei, 
and entailed a police officer stopping a pickup truck and seizing a revolver 
inside the vehicle. There were twO witnesses, the defendant-movant and the 
police officer, and these roles were performed by a law student and a member of 
the Honolulu Police Department. Chief Justice King presided, and the author 
and a colleague played the roles of counsel. The judges observed the hearing, 
discussed issues and procedures at its conclusion, and then wrote opinions de-
ciding the motion to suppress. There was a sharply contested fact-credibility 
issue that could have been dispositive of the motion. Defendant insisted that 
85 Bowman, The Hawaii Ruin 0/ Evidence, 2 U. HAW. 1. REV. 431, 465-74 (981). 
88 E. CLEARY, supra note 81, at 726 (quoting THAYER. PRELIMINARY TREAnSE ON EVIDENCE 
47 (898». 
87 FSM CONST. art. IV. § 6. 
88 Cf Levin & Cohen. The Exclusionary Rules in Nonjury Criminal Cases. 119 U. PA. L. REV. 
905. 925-29 (971); Weinstein. Alternatives to the Pment Hearsay Ruin. 44 F.R.D. 375. 382 
(968). 
88 The principal costs of the seminars. which are regularly funded by the FSM and Palau 
governments. are in the areas of travel and per diem for the participant judges. These costs were 
significantly increased in the Honolulu seminar. and the United States Information Agency gener-
ously lent support. 
Judges were housed at the University'S East-West Center. Seminar sessions were held twice 
daily at the law faculty conference room. 
80 See A. BOWMAN. SYLLABUS AND MATERIALS FOR THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONE-
SIA-REPUBLIC OF PALAU JUDICIAL SEMINAR (986). 
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the weapon was the fruit of a search of the glove compartment, but the officer 
maintained that the gun barrel was in open view protruding from a paper bag 
on the floor of the truck. The police officer's reasons for stopping the truck and 
his conduct of the arrest and seizure raised issues under a provision of the FSM 
Constitution bearing substantial similarity to the fourth amendment.91 
The judges' opinions were excellent. Withour exception, they perceived the 
need to resolve the fact question and to find specifically the location of the 
revolver immediately prior to its seizure. They had previously read, briefed, and 
discussed in seminar five FSM Supreme Court search and seizure opinions92 of 
possible relevance to disposition of the motion to suppress, and they analyzed 
several of these cases in the legal discussion portions of their opinions. Every 
opinion furnished an adequate record for appellate review of the point. 
The summer 1986 seminar was held in Truk and consisted of a week de-
voted to civil procedure and a week of examination and discussion of the Com-
pacts of Free Association.98 If a nation is not fully independent of another the 
next best status, it might be contended, is free association. The compact be-
tween the United States and FSM94 recognizes that FSM is "self-governing" 
and fully autonomous in its internal affairs. In the conduct of foreign affairs, on 
the other hand, the free association status requires that FSM "consult" with the 
United States and afford the United States "full authority and responsibility for 
security and defense matters"91i in the islands. The United States will have the 
authority to "establish and use" military bases in FSM, and the Micronesians 
will receive substantial sums of money every year during the life of the 
Compact. 96 
The materials on the compacts raised the important question, since resolved 
by the Palau Supreme Court,97 whether the Compact of Free Association com-
ports with the requirement of the Palau Constitution that any "agreement 
81 See supra note 30. 
82 Ludwig v. FSM, 2 FSM Intrm. 27 (App. Div. 1985) (search incident to arrest); Ishizawa v. 
Pohnpei, 2 FSM Intrm. 67 (Tr. Div. Pohnpei 1985) (search and seizure of fishing vessel); FSM 
v. George, 1 FSM Intrm. 449 (Tr. Div. Kosrae 1984) (issue of consent to enter private resi-
dence); FSM v. Mark, 1 FSM Intrm. 284 (Tr. Div. Pohnpei 1983) (seizure of plants from 
garden); FSM v. Tipen, 1 FSM Intrm. 79 (Tr. Div. Pohnpei 1982) (search of handbag). 
88 ]. VAN DYKE & E. YAMAMOTO, SYLLABUS AND MATERIAlS FOR THE FEDERATED STATES OF 
MICRONESIA-REPUBUC OF PALAU JUDICIAL SEMINAR (986). 
H The Compacts of Free Association between the United States and the Govemments of the 
Marshall Islands and FSM are reprinted in H.RJ. RES. 187, Pub. L. No. 99-239, U.S.C.S. 
(Supp., Feb. 1986) 4156. They have been approved by plebiscite in the Marshalls and FSM, and 
were signed into law by President Reagan on January 14, 1986. Final United Nations approval 
of the Compacts is contemplated in U.N. CHARTER arts. 83, 85. 
8a Compact of Free Association § 31l(a) . 
.., [d. §§ 211-219, 31l(b)(3). 
8'7 Gibbons v. Salii, No. 8-86 (Sup. Ct. Palau) Sept. 17, 1986). 
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which authorizes use, testing, storage or disposal of nuclear weapons in-
tended for use in warfare shall require approval of not less than three-fourths 
(%) of the votes cast in [a nationwide] referendum."98 On September 27, 
1986, in Gibbons v. Sa/ii,99 the Palau Supreme Court, per Chief Justice 
Nakamura, held that the Compact of Free Association with the United States, 
which received only 72% approval in a February, 1986, referendum in Palau, 
"has nOt been properly approved" and thus cannot be entered into by the Palau 
government. The problem is that Section 324 of the CompactlOO would have 
empowered the United States "to operate nuclear capable or nuclear propelled 
vessels and aircraft within the jurisdiction of Palau without either confirming or 
denying the presence or absence of such weapons . . . ." In the wake of Gib-
bons, the United States and Palau will need to begin again the process of negoti-
ating the future political status of Palau. 
The January, 1987, seminar, held on Kosrae and Pohnpei, treated contempt 
of court, judicial recusal and disqualification, judicial and legal ethics, and com-
mercial law.IOI The mock trial featured a motion for recusal of the trial judge 
and an issue of statutory interpretation. The ethics materials presented issues of 
judges' personal ethics and of the judges' responsibiliry for regulating the prac-
tice of law in FSM. Each of the FSM states and the national government has 
adopted either the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility or the ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct as the local governing standards, and so the Kos-
rae materials included problems and questions calling for solution under both 
sets of model rules. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The partnership of the Supreme Courts of the Federated States of Micronesia 
and the Republic of Palau and the Richardson School of Law has produced a 
training program for trial and appellate judges in Micronesia. The law school's 
involvement in this endeavor can be seen as an aspect of its commitment to 
Pacific legal studies and Pacific Island legal development. The faculty is grateful 
to Chief Justice Edward C. King for having made it all possible. 
98 PALAU CONST. art. II, § 3; see also id. art. XIII, § 6. 
99 See supra note 97. 
100 See). VAN DYKE & E. YAMAMOTO, supra note 93, at 79. 
101 See A. BOWMAN & A. KASTELY, SYLLABUS AND MATERIALS FOR THE FEDERATED STATES OF 
MICRONESIA-REPUBUC OF PALAU lUDlOAL SEMINAR (1986). 
